Introduction
The development of international financial markets over the past several years (like the development of domestic markets in the U.S.j is proceeding at a recolSd pace. Trade In foreign stocks has risen dramaticajlT in the U.S. risk-averse individuals inhabit these countries. Each has an Instantaneous utility function U(x) U(y) . where x and y are consumptionS of goods N and V. In a stationary equilibrium country A exports to B half of its endowment of'N and imports half of the country B endowment of Y. Now introduce a simple government policy: the government of the domestic country imposes a lump-sum tax on domestic residents and uses the proceeds to make lump-sum ("foreign aid') transfer payments to residents of the other country. The results of this policy, according to an economist using the method of comparative statics on th model's equilibrium, would be that wealth is redistributed. Domestic wealth falls and foreign wealth rises. so domestic consumption of each good falls and foreign consumption rises. Had this government policy been perfectly anticipated. the results would have been the same in the absence of international financial markets. The results would also be the same. in the absence of international financial markets. if individuals had been uncertain about future government policies. Because everyone in the domestic country is identical by assumption, it is impossible to sell on domestic markets the risk inherent in uncertainty about future policy.
Suppose that. in this example. there are international financial markets in noncontingent claims, that is. simple borrowing and lending is allowed.
Uncertainty about future government policy in the domestic country will induce risk-averse, expected-utility-maximizing domestic individuals to self-insure by saving. They will consume less X and Y. and save more. in periods without the policy, that is. in periods when the government does not tax them to provide foreign aid. They will dissave in periods with the policy, in order to mitigate its effects. Foreigners will consume more in periods without the policy. in anticipation of possible foreign-aid receipts in some future period, and dissave in periods with the foreign aid. The size ofthe change in consumption immediately following the imposition of the government policy is smaller in the presence of borrowing and lending.
because loan markets permit consumption-smoothing. The magnitude of these changes in saving and consumption, and of any associated changes in interest rates. depends on how expectations of future policy change over time (which in turn depends on the stochastit process governing the policy), the curvature of the utility function. etc. Clearly, some self-insurance possibilities are present because of international capital markets. though noncontingent claims are inferior to contingent claims for this purpose.
Complete contingent claims would eliminate the effect of the actual policy on consumption in this example. Because all individuals have the same information and agree upon the relevant probability distributions in this example. they will choose to trade in claims, prior to the realization of policy, that undo" the income transfer from any potential policy. Because only the domestic government may impose this policy, foreigners are wealthier than domestic residents and will consume more every period, regardless of whether the domestic government actually makes the transfers. Given the initial probabilities (at date 0 that the government will make transfers of particular sizes in various time-periods, actual imposition of a transfer has no effects whatsoever. introduction of complete international financial markets. therefore, has major implications regarding the effects of this policy.
The treatment of government policy as uncertain and exogenous deserves some comment. The assumption of exogeneity is inessential. though it corresponds to questions economists frequently ask. such as "what would be the effects of a rise in taxes?" Government policy might well be the outcome of a political equilibrium with inputs such as lobbying. voting, and exogenous shifts in opportunities, which operate through political institutions that constrain bureaucrats. politicians. lobbyists, and voters.
Generally, such a model will have elements of randomness attached to its inputs. so that resulting policies will be Stchastjc Policy can then be treated as a stochastic process (that might be correlated with stochastic processes on other disturbances to the economy). Lucas (1976) . and.
subsequently. Coolev, LeRoy. and Raymon (1984a.b) have argued that the assumption of rational expectations requires the stochastic process on policy to be specified as part of the environment of constraints under which individuals maximize utility. Lucas applied this argument to the investment tax credit and other policies. Coolev. LeRoy. and Raymon have applied the argument to policy on the growth rate of the money supply. Stockman and Dellas (1985) have applied it to tariffs, and Stockman and Hernandez (1985) to exchange controls. Rather than changing government policy in a way that individuals thought was impossible when they maximized utilit . the economist is constrained to consider changes in policies that correspond to the probability distributions that are part of a fully specified economic environment that is known to individuals when they make their choices.2
Without international financial markets (and abstracting from differences across individuals within a country), the treatment of government policies as outcomes of a stochastic process has no effect on allocations (though it may affect prices). Given the treatment of future government policy as part of the stochastic environment facing individuals when they make choices, the availability of international financial markets in state-contingent claims can have major effects on the results of policies. The next three sections of the paper present examples of these effects on fiscal policies.
When government policies are not simply redistributions. financial markets will not simply undo the policies. Generally, pure social gains and losses from policies will be shared among participants in financial markets. Distortions introduced by policies. however, cannot be eliminated by financial markets: substitution effects of policies will continue to operate. In Stockman and Dellas (1985) . for example. the effects of tariffs are examined In a world with complete international asset markets. In a two-country. two-good world with trade due to differing endowments. a small tariff raises consumption of the exportable good and improves welfare in the absence of financial markets. With these markets. however, a tariff reduces consumption: consumption of both goods is lower with a domestic tariff and no foreign tariff than with a foreign tariff and no domestic tariff. The existence of contingent assets. therefore. has a major impact on the positive implications of the theory. The results obtain from the ability of these assets to eliminate income effects of changes in policy (as individuals spread wealth optimally across prospective states of the world), leaving substitution effects in place. Rosen's (1985) survey of implicit contracts in labor economics makes a similar point about optimal contractual arrangements.
The Consider a two-country world in which the domestic country is endowed with a tradeable good X and the foreign country is endowed with a tradeable good V. There is a representative, risk-averse, expected-utility-maximizing individual in each country who has instantaneous utility function 13(x) -V(y). Purchases or consumption of' X require a productive input to reduce "transactions costs" that use up real resources. They may include costs of shipping the good to its location of consumption, costs of consuming the good. or costs of household production such as preparation. etc. It is simplest to assume that X. besides being a consumption good. is a productive input into this 'transactions" activity. X can be used privately by an individual to produce transactions services, or it can be used by the government to produce a public good that has a positive marginal product for transactions services. One might think of X as system of roads and bridges.
police and security services, courts to enforce criminal law. or other productive public goods. These public goods interact with private production of transactions services and lower private costs of a given volume of transactions. Let g be the level of government expenditure on these items (and neglect all other government spending). Individuals who wish to consume units of X must purchase x09(g) units of X. where 9-1 > 0 of the goods are used for transactions services and the rest are consumed. The productivity of government expenditures motivates the conditions 9' < 0 and 9" > 0.
The representative individual in the domestic country maximizes expected utility of consumption of X and Y in each state of the world z. x(z) and y(z). given the exogenous probability distribution F(z) on states. So he
subject to the budget constraint.
where X is the (state-independent) endowment of good X. and p(z) and q(z) are domestic present-value state prices of X and V at date t. e.g. if z0 is a possible value of z at date t. then Pizot) is the present-value (period zero)
price of X in state z0 at date t in the domestic country. The time subscripts on the functions inside the integral have been suppressed. This formulation permits complete markets within the country. In the absence of complete international financial markets. state prices may differ across countries. For simplicity. I abstract from all uncertainty except that which enters through future government policy. The state vector can be written as
where g and g* are the levels of government expenditure in the two countries. The public-good aspects of government spending do not extend outside national boundaries, by assumption, so 9 depends only on g and 9* depends only on g*: these functions will be written 9(g) and e*(g*).
The representative individual in the foreign country has a similar maximization problem, though his utility function may be different and his budget constraint is different. He maximizes
where stars denote foreign variables. While foreign and domestic state prices may differ in the absence of complete international financial markets.
arbitrage in the goods market on a state-by-state basis guarantees that the relative price of X in terms of V in each state is equal across countries.
i.e. p(zLq(z)p*(Z)q(Z) for everyz.
In absence of international financial markets. equilibrium requires that in whatever state of the world materializes, world supply and demand are equated for each good. that is.
In. addition, equilibrium in domestic asset markets (and similarly in foreign asset markets) requires that demands and supplies of state-contingent assets are equal. Because everyone is alike within a country. there are no net trades on these domestic asset markets. However, the equilibrium conditions can be used to price assets, that is, to find the prices at which individuals are satisfied with zero net trades. If asset prices differ across countries so that for some z, p(z-) p*(z) or q(z) q*(z), then there are private gains from trade. on international asset markets.
Necessary conditions for utility maximization in each country and equilibrium conditions in the goods markets give three equations, for each date t, in domestic consumption of each good and, with the normalization q = 1, the relative price p. These are (with time subscripts suppressed)
U*I((X_ex_g_g*)/e*) = and (7c) pX = p9x+y÷pg.
Foreign allocations can then be determined from equilibrium conditions.
Using the last equation to eliminate the price, the system reduces to two equations in two unknowns. Comparative statics can be used to determine the effects of changes in government spending in either country. An increase in government spending may move the economy toward or away from the socially efficient level of spending. An increase in government spending in the domestic country raises domestic consumption of X by IxO'dgf for any given gross domestIc purchases of X; the cost is dg units of X. The socially optimal level of X is. therefore. implicitly given by xe' = -1. Similarly.
the socially optimal level of foreign government spending is given implicitiy by x*9*I = -1. The analysis of changes in government spending is simplified by consideration of changes In g or g* around the socially optimal points.3
The results of total differentiation are then4
where
E y9\''(y) < 0.
7T4
-ex _g)u*1u(x*!e* -OU*I(x*) l (*) -e*V*I (y*) < 0. and 7r6 y9*'\T*'(y*) < 0. imply that for every z.
7*1(y -y(z)) = ' V'(y(z)) and (II)
where is the ratio of the the marginal utility of wealth of the representative foreign individual to the marginal utility of wealth of the represefltatj'e domestic individual.j.e. the multiplier on (5) divided by the multiplier on (2). Note that • is a function of the probability distribution F(z). but does not depend on realized values of g or g*. (10) and (11) 
(-U 8/9* -U#9*9 ) dx(z) = (_9IUI9*/9 *'/9*)dg
The coefficients on dx(z) is positive. At the socially optimal g and g*. . = = 0. In that case small changes in g or g* have no first-order effects on economic efficiency, the coefficient on dg is positive, and the coefficient on dg* is negative. An increase in domestic government spending raises domestic consumption of exportables. while an increase in foreign government spending reduces it. Because these results are obtained in the neighborhood of the social optimum. changes in g and g*, have no income effects.
Therefore. an increase in domestic government spending reduces foreign imports. while an increase in foreign government spending raises them.6
These results on the effects of changes in productive government expenditure in the presence of sophisticated international financial markets contrast with the ambiguous effects obtained in their absence.
DIstorting Taxes
The previous section assumed that taxes were lump sum. This section examines the effects of changes in distorting taxes with and without Sophisticated international financial markets. As in the previous section.
the results Illustrate that any effects of policy that operate through redistributions of wealth are eliminated by complete international financial markets. This section applies that principle to a tax on consumption. The tax might take the form of value-added tax or an income tax with various effective deductions or credits for saving. This section uses a two-country mode] similar to the one in the last section. hut simplified to include only two time periods the extension to more is straightforward) and a single consumption good that is endowed to both countries, then the timing of endowments differs across countries, there Is an obvious role for financial markets: borrowing and lending will facilitate intertemporal smoothing of consumption. Suppose that in the first period the home endowment is small and the foreign endowment is large. and that this is reversed in the second period. Then the home country will borrow from the foreign country in the first period, and repay its loans in the second period.
This section will examine the effects of a temporary increase in domestic consumption taxes in the first period, under several assumptions about accompanying changes required by the government's budget constraint. In the absence of international financial markets other than those for simple.
noncontingent loans, a tax increase has a Substitution effect and an Income effect. Starting from a situation of equal taxation in the two periods, a rise Ifl first-period domestic taxes, with a lump-sum refund of the tax revenue, reduces the domestic demand for loans and lowers the interest rate at which the domestic country borrows. A small increase in taxes reduces first-period consumption and raises second-period consumption. These results are changed in the presence of complete international financial markets.
Assume the representative individual In the domestic country maximizes
where c and L are consumption and leisure. one unit of time is available each period, and primes denote second-period variables. For simplicity. it will be assumed that U12 = 0 (which does not affect the main results but reduces the algebra involved). Output. y. is a stochastic function of labor inputs:
where is a positive random variable. Similarly, second-period output is y' = a'L'. The government taxes consumption at a rate r. Define T The foreign country has an analogous description that will not be repeated here. In the absence of state-contingent international assets, but with noncontingent international loans markets, the budget constrai can be Simplified. The simplification reflects the zero net trades on internal asset markets due to the representative agent assumption. The budget constrajit with only noncontingent international loans is effectively
where p is the inverse of one plus the interest rate on default-free loans.
Equilibrium Conditions are U*1(a_a*_g_g*_c) = (18) follows from maximization of (13) subject to (16). and (19) follows from the analogous foreign maximization problem along with (17) and the balanced-budget assumption. Recall that government spending varies with tax
Consider a realization of and a' for which c g < a in equilibriun:.
This would happen if. for example. the countries are identical ex ante. if (a.a*) and (a.a*') are independently drawn. g=g*. and the realized value of a* exceeds that of a. Then the domestic country is a net borrower in the first period. Differentiation of (18)- (19) shows that (as long as c-a is not too large) an increase in first-period domestic taxes reduces private consumption but has an Indeterminate effect on aggregate demand and the interest rate because of the increase in government purchases. Second period consumption.
c' = (a' R(a-Tc))/T', is also Indeterminate. It depends on the direction of the interest rate change and the magnitudes of the substitution and wealth effects.
:19
The effects of a consumption tax are changed when individuals have access to complete international financial markets. Then the equilibrium conditions (17) must hold on a state-by-state basis. These conditions, and the necessary conditions for utility maximization in each country. imply
/U2*(l_L*tz))T*,a* and (24) Tr(z)E1(C(z)) / p(z)T = arbitrary constant for all z. In these equations.
• is the ratio of the foreign marginal utility of wealth to the domestic marginal utility of wealth (a ratio of multipliers on the wealth constraints ) . and the constant in the last equation is arbitrary because one of the state prices can be normalized without loss of' generality. The first three sets of' equations (for each z). (2fl-(23).
determine production, trade, and consumption, and (24) then determines state prices, Another set of equations, identical in form to these. describes the solution for equilibrium in the second period. (This result is. however, sensitive to the assumption that utility is separable in goods and leisure.) Unlike the case in which international financial markets are limited to noncontingent bonds. a change in taxes and government spending in the first period leaves output in each country unaffected in the second period.
The assumption that government spending has no effect on marginal utilities of other goods is extreme. Kormendi (1983) and Aschauer (1985) have estimated that roughly one-third of government consumption can be 
Budget Deficits without Debt Neutrality
In this section I build upon the work by Frenkel and Razin (1986) A single good is endowed to these two countries, and the endowments follow an exogenous stochastic process. The description of the two countries is identical: each country is essentially described by Blanchard's model.
Foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk. Individuals face a fixed probability of death in each period, regardless of age. denoted (1-c). where a is the survival-probability. They contract with life-insurance companies.
which collect an individual s assets and liabilities upon his death. Yaari (1965) discusses the equivalence between these companies and a set of annuity and bond markets. A transversality condition requires that the limit (as the length of his life goes to infinity) of the present value of' net assets is nonnegative. so an individual does not borrow an unrestricted amount in the expectation that the life-insurance company will bail him out when he dies. Insurance companies are perfectly competitive and operate costlessly so that insurance pretnia are proportional factors equal to the probability of death. Under these assumptions, and with denoting the present value price of a good at date t. _1'a is one plus the one-period interest rate at t-i.
is one plus the life-insurance premium at t-l. and the gross interest rate (including the insurance premium) faced by an individual is
The discount factor is fixed at 6 and utility is time-separable and instantaneously logarithmic: individuals maximize expected utility, Following Blanchard. aggregate consumption Is then
where is aggregate wealth, which equals discounted disposable personal income (discounted with the gross interest rate) minus private debt. In general, in the Frenkel-Razin analysis. the probabilities of death. discount rates. etc. may differ across countries, It will be convenient here. though.
to focus on the simplest case in which all these parameters are equal across Countries. Governments in each country finance an exogenous stochastic process of spending, which has no effect on production or any marginal rates of or marginal utilities, with either taxes or debt. The government, which lives forever, discounts at a rate that does not in'corporate an insurance premium. The present value of spending plus initial government debt equals the present value of taxes.
The equilibrium condition in the world goods market at t=O is using the gross private discount factor. Bg is government debt at date 0 (so that future tax liabilities and government debt are both included in wealth).
and B0 is net indebtedness at t=0 of the domestic consumers to foreign consumers. To keep matters as simple as possible. I assume that this initial private indebtedness is zero. that government debt is equal in each country.
that current government spending is equal in each country. and that the probability distribution of future government spending is the same in the two countries.
Following Frenkel and Razin. dates after t=0 are assumed to have, with probability one. some constant levels of government spending. taxes. and outputs (which. while they are constant for t=l.2.3 may differ from the values at t=0). Then the present value function is PV0(x) = x1oR/(1-oR) where x. is the future (t=l,2. . . .) value of x and R is an average present-value price. (26)- (28) then determine R and wealth in each country
for given values in each country of government spending. initial government debt. taxes. output. and initial private indebtedness. Now consider a tax cut financed by increased government borrowing in the domestic dountry at t=O. Assume that the foreign government has a balanced budget and that the domestic government budget was balanced prior to the tax cut. The government budget constraint implies that dT0 -Rd71/(l-R)
because taxes are raised in all future periods (equally) to offset the current tax cut. Using this fact. differentiation of (26)- (28) implies that the tax cut reduces R. i.e. raises the interest rate. raises domestic wealth.
and lowers foreign wealth (see Frenkel and Razin) .
Consider now an extension of this analysis to Incorporate complete international financial markets. The results above apply to a world in which individuals can trade on annuity markets with other residents of the same country (recall that the "insurance companies' are essentially annuity and bond markets), but they are unable to trade in contingent international financial markets.9 In particular. suppose that it is possible to trade gain equally from a domestic tax cut. With the symmetry assumptions, the tax cut has no effect on the current account. though the interest rate rises due to the increase in aggregate demand. The rise in the interest rate reduces the quantity demanded to the level of the fixed supply of goods and. in equilibrium, the current consumption of each individual is unaffected. 2. This does not imply that individuals have perfect knowledge of all parameters in the model. it does imply. though, that individuals "know that they don t know' certain things.
3. Given foreign consumption of X and foreign government spending. domestic consumption if maximized by g such that xe'=-i. Andrew Abel has correctly pointed out in his comments that while the world social optimum is characterized by Xe' = x*9*I = -1. this may not be the optimum for either country individually. Changes in g or g* around some other value that might describe the equilibrium of a policy game between the two countries involve additional ambiguities in the results. The additional terms reflect changes 1n the distortion caused by not having government spending at the optimal level for the world.
4. Substitution of (7c) into (7a) and (7b) gives (X -Ox -g) U'(x) = eV'(y)y (X -Ox -g) U*JUX -Ox -g -g*)/9*)
= y e*V*'(Y -y)
Recall that 9 = 0(g) and 9* = 9*(g*). Total differentiation gives which reduces to (8) and (9) if Xe' = X0K' = 1.
5.
Letting A and ) be the domestic and foreign marginal utilities of wealth. necessary conditions for maximization of (1.) subject to (2) include.
for every z and t.
= A p(z) 9(g) and *V'(y(z)) = A q(z).
Similarly, the foreign maximization problem yields necessary conditions A* p*(z) e*(g*) and *T*I(y*(Z)) = A* q*(z), Dividing these equations. noting that state prices are equated internationally so p(z) = p*(z) and q(z) = q*(z). and using equiibriun! conditions to eliminate x*z) and y*(z). yields (101 and (11) . where A* 'A. . These results illustrate that any income effects from efficiency gains or losses are shared internationally.
7.
ThIs result follows directly from (2iJ-(23). which imply that *U2(1-L)/ = Given and * (and ). L and L* move together. 
